Supplemental Jurisdiction (28 USC 1367) allows claims that could not have entered federal court on their own to be heard by a federal court if they are part of a case over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction.
Valid supplemental claims must be a part of the same "common nucleus of operative fact" as the valid federal claim (Gibbs)
Supplemental jurisdiction is barred if P tries to bring in another party based solely on diversity that would destroy diversity (Kroger)
Court can refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction (28 USC 1367(c)) if…
The claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law.
The claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.
The district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.
Other exceptional circumstances.
**Full Supplemental Jurisdiction**
Supplemental Jurisdiction allows claims that could not have entered federal court on their own to be heard by a federal court if they are part of a case over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction.
Ex: B sues S in federal court (b/c of diversity) for $250k in injuries after a car accident, S's counterclaim against B for $500 in damages to her car falls within the court's supplemental jurisdiction b/c it is factually related to B's claim, even though S would not be able to file the $500 suit in federal court on its own (because of amt in controversy requirement).
Supplemental Jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. §1367, a 1990 statute. Before 1990, Supp. Jurisdiction was governed by common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction- common law supplemental jurisdiction doctrines
Pendent jurisdiction allowed federal courts to take jurisdiction over claims asserted by the original P for which there was no independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction. Two questions:
Does the federal court have the constitutional power to hear the state law claim?
A federal question that is sufficiently substantial to confer jurisdiction
A common nucleus of operative facts (Gibbs)
Separate claims that one would expect to be tried in one judicial proceeding- commonsense approach.
If power exists, should the court in its discretion assert pendent jurisdiction?
Ancillary jurisdiction usually involved claims by a person other than the original P where no independent basis of jurisdiction existed. Included:
Counterclaims- Included claims by D against P
Cross-claims- Claims by D against a co-D
Intervention- Claims by a third party against D
Impleader- Claims by D against a third party who might also be liable
Leading up to Supplemental Jurisdiciton... Gibbs, Kroger , and Finley
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs
SCOTUS held that if the federal court has a basis for subject matter jurisdiction over one of the P's claims, it may hear other claims that arise out of the same "nucleus of operative fact."
The reasoning was that the Framers must have understood that cases involve multiple claims, and that they must have contemplated that the federal court would hear the entire dispute, as long as there was a "federal hook" from which to append the other, jurisdictionally insufficient claims.
Owen Equipment v. Kroger
SCOTUS explained that federal courts can't hear claims just because they are within the constitutional scope of Article III as explained by Gibbs; Congress must authorize them to hear the claims as well, by statute. Even if allowed to do so, federal courts cannot resolve all claims in the case unless a federal statute authorizes the federal court to hear the related claims.
Finley v. United States
The Court ruled that unless Congress had expressly authorized jurisdiction over the pendent parties, the lack of such an authorization was fatal.
This was different from Aldinger v. Howard and Kroger, which required that there be evidence that Congress had rejected the pendent party jurisdiction in order for jurisdiction to be invalid.
Essentially, Finley was the death knell for pendent party jurisdiction, because if there were a statute that expressly allowed for jurisdiction then there would be no need to invoke the doctrine, and without such a statute the doctrine could not be employed.
The Finley court invited Congress to do something about it. Congress responded with §1367.
Supplemental Jurisdiction under §1367
Congress reacted by enacting 28 USC 1367(a) which broadly authorizes federal courts to exercise "supplemental jurisdiction"
§1367 provides for "supplemental jurisdiction" and replaces the common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. Three important aspects:
§1367(a)- incorporates Gibbs limits on claims over which there is no independent basis of jurisdiction to those that are part of the same constitutional case or controversy as the jurisdiction-conferring claim.
Most courts use the "common nucleus of operative fact" principle.
Some give §1367(a) a broader reading, allowing sup jurisdiction over claims that have only a "loose factual connection" to the jurisdiction-conferring claim.
If a claim satisfies the Gibbs test, it satisfies the statute and vice versa.
§1367(a) expressly allows the addition of new parties.
Although the statute recognizes the importance of congressional intent, it no longer allows a court to infer or imply congressional intent to negate. A court must find that Congress has "expressly provided otherwise by federal statute."
§1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction where a district court's jurisdiction is "founded solely on §1332," the diversity statute.
This was an attempt to codify Kroger ruling.
In diversity cases only, the federal court will not have supplemental jurisdiction over certain claims by Ps or persons sought to be joined as Ps,
The purpose for this exception to 1367(a) is to prevent parties from evading the Strawbridge complete diversity rule.
1367(b) does not apply when the extra parties are brought in by the D.
§1367(c) sets out four grounds on which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Sharp split among federal circuits on these questions. Most courts say it preserves the full range of discretion recognized in Gibbs, while others take the position that the statute strictly cabins a court's discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction.
§1367(d) says that if a federal court refuses to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the statute of limitations is tolled for the period during which the federal suit was pending and for at least 30 days after the dismissal.
SOL is tolled only if the state law claim in question in fact fell within the courts §1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction.
Ex: In Barry Aviation v. Land O'Lakes, the Court said that §1367(d) does not apply to P's claims that Ds breached the parties' contract, because these claims are not part of the same case or controversy as federal constitutional claims.
SCOTUS also held that §1367(d) does not apply to claims filed in federal court against nonconsenting States, because the 11th amendment bars a federal court from hearing claims against a state w/o the state's consent.
